Does leaving a currency union reduce international trade? We answer this question using a large annual panel data set covering 217 countries from 1948 through 1997. During this sample a large number of countries left currency unions; they experienced economically and statistically significant declines in bilateral trade, after accounting for other factors. Assuming symmetry, we estimate that a pair of countries that starts to use a common currency experiences a near doubling in bilateral trade.
1: Introduction
In this short paper we ask the question "What is the effect of currency union 1 membership on international trade?" Since an increase in trade prompted by currency union would be an unexpected benefit of European Monetary Union (EM) or dollarization, this is an interesting question to both policy-makers and academics. Rose (2000) estimated this effect using an essentially cross-sectional approach. He used data for a large number of countries between 1970 and 1990 and found that bilateral trade was higher for a pair of countries that used the same currency than for a pair of countries with their own sovereign monies. More precisely, the coefficient (denoted γ) on a currency union (CU) dummy in an empirical model of bilateral trade was found to be positive and significant in both economic and statistical terms. Its value rarely fell below 1.2, implying an effect of currency union on trade of around (e 1.2 ≈) 300%. This was true even after controlling for a number of other factors, which might affect trade through the "gravity" model. The latter states that trade between a pair of countries is proportional to their combined incomes, and inversely proportional to the distance between them.
There are a number of potential issues with the cross-sectional approach. Most importantly, the policy question of interest is the (time series) question "What is the trade effect of a country joining (or leaving) a currency union?" not the cross-sectional question "How much more do countries within currency unions trade than non-members?" Other possible problems are econometric; for instance, pair-specific "fixed effects" may obscure the econometric estimates.
In this paper, we estimate the effect of currency unions on trade exploiting time series (as well as cross-sectional) variation. We use a data set that covers a large number of countries for fifty post-war years. During this sample, a large number of currency unions dissolved, allowing us to use both time series and cross-sectional variation on currency union incidence. In particular, we use the fact that over one hundred country-pairs dissolved common currency linkages during the sample. By comparing their trade before and after this regime change (holding other effects constant), we can estimate the effect of currency union membership on trade. Our panel approach, which exploits variation for a large number of countries, can be contrasted with the case-study methodology employed by Thom and Walsh (2000) . Thom and Walsh focus on the dissolution of the currency union between Ireland and the UK in 1979, and interpret their results as showing few effects on Irish-British trade. The question we pose in this paper is: can the conclusions of Thom and Walsh be generalized beyond the Irish-British case?
Reassuringly, we find that our results are basically consistent with those of Rose (2000) .
We find an economically and statistically significant effect of currency unions on trade using a number of different panel estimation techniques. Our estimate is that bilateral trade approximately doubles/halves as a pair of countries forms/dissolves a currency union, ceteris paribus.
In section 2, we describe the data set and methodology that we use. Section 3 is the heart of the paper, and presents estimation results of the effect of currency union on trade. After some sensitivity analysis, the paper concludes with a brief summary.
2: Methodology and Data

Gravity Methodology
We are interested in estimating the effect of currency unions on international trade.
Towards that end, we estimate a conventional gravity model of international trade. 2 We augment the model with a number of extra controls: where i and j denotes countries, t denotes time, and the variables are defined as:
• X ijt denotes the average value of real bilateral trade between i and j at time t,
• Y is real GDP,
• Pop is population,
• D is the distance between i and j,
• Lang is a binary variable which is unity if i and j have a common language,
• Cont is a binary variable which is unity if i and j share a land border,
• FTA is a binary variable which is unity if i and j belong to the same regional trade agreement, • Landl is the number of landlocked countries in the country-pair (0, 1, or 2).
• Island is the number of island nations in the pair (0, 1, or 2),
• Area is the land mass of the country,
• ComCol is a binary variable which is unity if i and j were ever colonies after 1945 with the same colonizer, • CurCol is a binary variable which is unity if i and j are colonies at time t,
• Colony is a binary variable which is unity if i ever colonized j or vice versa,
• ComNat is a binary variable which is unity if i and j remained part of the same nation during the sample (e.g., France and Guadeloupe, or the UK and Bermuda), • CU is a binary variable which is unity if i and j use the same currency at time t,
• β is a vector of nuisance coefficients, and
• ε ij represents the myriad other influences on bilateral exports, assumed to be well behaved.
The coefficient of interest to us is γ, the effect of a currency union on trade.
We estimate the model with a number of techniques below. We follow the norm in the literature by using ordinary least squares, albeit with standard errors which are robust to clustering (since pairs of countries are likely to be highly dependent across years). However, the force of the paper rests in employing a number of panel data techniques. We use both fixed and random effects estimators extensively below. We rely on the robust fixed effects "within" estimator, which essentially adds a set of country-pair specific intercepts to the equation, and thus exploits only the time series dimension of the data set around country-pair averages.
The Data Set
Rose (2000) exploited a large data set originally developed by the United Nations, covering 186 countries from 1970 through 1990. In this paper we instead use the CD-ROM "Direction of Trade" (DoT) data set developed by the International Monetary Fund (IMF).
The DoT data set covers bilateral trade between 217 IMF country codes between 1948 and 1997 (with many gaps). Not all of the areas covered are countries in the conventional sense of the word; colonies (e.g., Bermuda), territories (e.g., Guam), overseas departments (e.g., Guadeloupe), countries that gained their independence (e.g., Guinea-Bissau), and so forth are all included. We use the term "country" simply for convenience. (The countries are listed in Appendix 1.) Bilateral trade on FOB exports and CIF imports is recorded in American dollars;
we deflate trade by the American CPI. 3 We create an average value of bilateral trade between a pair of countries by averaging all of the four possible measures potentially available. 4 To this data set, we add a number of other variables that are necessary to estimate the gravity model. We add population and real GDP data (in constant dollars) from three sources.
Wherever possible, we use "World Development Indicators" (taken from the World Bank's WDI 2000 CD-ROM) data. When the data are unavailable from the World Bank, we fill in missing observations with comparables from the Penn World Table Mark 5.6 , and (when all else fails), from the IMF's "International Financial Statistics". 5 The series have been checked and corrected for errors.
We exploit the CIA's "World Factbook" for a number of country-specific variables. is transitive; if country-pairs x-y, and x-z are in currency unions, then y-z is a currency union. In the data set, about 1% of the sample covers currency unions, a proportion comparable to that in Rose (2000) . The currency unions in our data set are tabulated in Appendix 2. A number of currency unions are sufficiently integrated that trade data are unavailable; this will tend to bias our estimate of γ downwards. 9 During the sample there were 16 switches into and 130 switches out of currency unions (for which we have data). There are a number of foibles with these regime switches. First, since we do not have many observations on currency union entries, we are forced to treat exits from and entries into currency unions symmetrically. Second, some of the transitions were related (e.g., Bermuda's switch from the pound sterling to the American dollar), and a number are crosssectionally dependent (e.g., Equatorial Guinea entered the CFA franc zone and so joined a currency union vis-à-vis many countries simultaneously). But while we do not have 146 independent observations on regime transitions, the number is still substantive. Our techniques exploit this time series feature of the data.
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Descriptive statistics for the data set are tabulated in Table 1 for both currency unions and non-unions. Sample means for the key gravity regressors are broadly similar for currency unions and non-unions, the exception being the common language and colonial variables.
3: Gravity-Based Estimates of the Effect of Currency Unions on Trade
OLS Estimates
We begin by estimating our gravity equation using conventional OLS (with a full set of year-specific intercepts added). Results are presented in Table 2 .
The gravity model works well in a number of different dimensions. The model fits the data well, explaining almost two-thirds of the variation in bilateral trade flows. The gravity coefficients are economically and statistically significant with sensible interpretations. For instance, economically larger and richer countries trade more; more distant countries trade less.
A common language, land border and membership in a regional trade agreement encourage trade, as does a common colonial history. The same nation coefficient is not intuitively signed but is statistically indistinguishable from zero.
The model delivers a γ estimate of 1.3, an estimate that is comparable to and slightly higher (in both economic and statistical significance) than that of Rose (2000) . The estimate implies that a pair of countries that are joined by a common currency trade over three times as much with each other (e 1.3 ≈ 3.7), holding other things constant.
It is possible to perform extensive robustness analysis for gravity estimates like those in Table 2 . For instance, we have estimated the model using only the cross-sectional aspects of the model, ignoring the time series features of our panel data set. When we do this, we find that γ remains economically and statistically large when estimated on individual years, though it does vary somewhat; results are in Table 3 . However, instead of pursuing that tack, we now make the most of the time series variation in our panel data set.
Fixed Effects Estimates
The fixed effect "within" estimator is the most appropriate way to exploit the panel nature of the data set without making heroic assumptions. It estimates γ by comparing trade for a pair of countries before CU creation/dissolution to trade for the same pair of countries after CU creation/dissolution. There are only two possible drawbacks to the estimator: the impossibility of estimating time-invariant factors, and a potential lack of efficiency. Since our data set is large, we are prepared to ignore the latter problem. Since γ can manifestly (as will be shown below) be estimated from the time series variation in currency union incidence, the former problem does not arise.
Above and beyond econometric robustness, the fixed effect estimator has one enormous advantage. Since the within estimator exploits variation over time, it answers the policy question of interest, namely the (time series) question "What is the trade effect of a country joining (or leaving) a currency union?" This can be contrasted with the cross-sectional question "How much more do countries within currency unions trade than non-members?" which was answered by Rose (2000) .
Estimation results are in Table 4 . We present the fixed effects estimates of γ and a few of the key gravity coefficients in the left-hand column. For comparison, we also tabulate random effects estimates, using a generalized least squares estimator assuming Gaussian disturbances that are uncorrelated with the random (country-pair specific) effects. The "between" estimator (which essentially runs a regression on group averages) and a normal maximum likelihood estimator are also shown at the right-hand side of the table.
The fixed effects estimate of γ is smaller than the OLS estimates of Table 2 ≈ 1.9, the estimate implies that joining a currency union leads bilateral trade to rise by about 90%, i.e., almost double. This effect is economically large, and statistically significant at conventional levels; the t-statistic is thirteen. The other estimators generate even bigger estimates of γ, though we prefer to be conservative. And while the nuisance (β) coefficients vary between fixed and random effects, the estimate of γ is reasonably robust.
Sensitivity Analysis
In Table 5 , we provide some sensitivity analysis. We perturb our basic methodology in a number of different ways, and tabulate estimates of γ using both fixed and random effects estimators. In particular: 1) we add a comprehensive set of year-specific controls; 2) instead of using all years of the sample, we use only the data from every fifth year; 3) we add quadratics of both output and output per capital; 4) we throw out all industrial country observations (those with IFS country codes under 200); 5) we throw out all small country observations (those with GDP<$1 billion); 6) we throw out all poor countries (those with real GDP per capita less than $1,000); 7) we retain only similarly-sized country-pairs (i.e., those with GDPs which differ by less than a factor of five); 8) we retain only country-pairs where bilateral trade is a small fraction (less than 10%) of total trade for both countries; 9) we retain only observations after 1960; 10)
we throw out all CFA-Franc observations; and 11) we throw out all ECCB observations, as well as those which involve the American dollar, the British pound sterling, or the French Franc.
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The results of Table 5 show that γ is reasonably insensitive to a number of different perturbations in our methodology. Our fixed effects estimates lie in the relatively narrow range of (.59, .80) and are consistent economically and statistically significant throughout. They are also consistent close to the random effects estimates of γ. Other estimators (such as the panel estimator tabulated in Table 2 , the between and maximum likelihood estimators tabulated in Table 4 ) show even higher estimates. 12 We have examined the symmetry of entries into and exits from currency unions, but are stymied by the paucity of observations on currency union entries (which are outnumbered by exits by a ratio of over 8:1). When we do separate currency union exits from entries, we find that the exit effect on trade is bigger than the entry effect, though our fixed effects and OLS estimates (but not the random effects estimate) do not reject equality of entry and exit coefficients at reasonable significance levels. Nevertheless, it should be noted that exits tended to take place early in the sample while entries occurred late, so the effects of lags (as well as the number of data points) might bias the effect of entry downwards compared to the effect of exits.
It would be interesting to pursue this issue using a methodology that accounts for the "interrupted spell" nature of the data, as well as the issues of (possibly non-randomly) missing data and repeated entries/exits from currency unions.
To summarize: a number of different panel estimators all deliver the conclusion that currency union has a strong positive effect on trade. We rely most on the fixed effects estimator since by essentially exploiting the time series variation in currency union arrangements, it is least demanding in terms of heroic econometric assumptions. Our fixed effects estimates indicate that entry into/departure from a currency union leads bilateral trade to approximately double/halve, holding a host of other features constant. This result is not only economically and statistically significant, but seems relatively robust.
Case Studies: Ireland, the UK and more
The fact that currency union dissolution typically has a substantial depressing effect on bilateral trade means that the conclusions of Thom and Walsh (2000) cannot be reasonably Still, the top-left graph shows that when Equatorial Guinea joined the CFA in 1985 (an event marked with a vertical line), it experienced a surge in its trade with Cameroon, a CFA member.
The Irish departure from the pound sterling is portrayed immediately to the right.
Immediately after Ireland's departure from sterling in 1979, its trade with Britain fell discretely for a period of years. Thom and Walsh tend to see a pig's ear in this decline, attributing it mostly to the business cycle, measurement error, and ad hoc effects. We tend to see a silk purse, but readily admit that since the growth in bilateral trade eventually resumed, no persistent negative effect is apparent. Thus our data reproduces the negative effect found by Thom and Walsh.
Still, the Irish-British case was the exception, not the rule. A number of other countries also left sterling; we portray data for New Zealand (another OECD country), the Gambia, Malawi, Sierra Leone, Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia. All experienced declines in their trade with the UK. This is also true of a number of other countries that dissolved currency union links after WW2, as Figure 1 clearly shows.
Of course, the raw data portrayed in Figure 1 do not take into account the effects of output, free trade areas, independence, and the like. Further, it might be objected that we have chosen the case studies of Figure 1 carefully, as indeed we have. But that is the quintessence of the case study approach. It is also the reason we prefer to trust our panel study with a broad representative sample. The objective of the statistical work in Tables 2 through 5 is to show that currency union dissolution typically has a depressing effect on trade, even accounting for a host of other factors. This is true for the data sample as a whole, and also for many subsets of the data (though perhaps not for the Irish-British case).
Caveats
There are issues associated with the applicability of our results. Since our sample ends before EMU, most of the currency unions involved countries that were either small, poor, or both; our results may therefore be inapplicable to EMU. Of course that is true of all work on currency unions. Ireland in 1979 was also small and poor compared to the EMU countries in 1998. 13 Thus, extrapolating from the single case considered by Thom and Walsh (2001) seems at least as dangerous as extrapolating from our many cases (which include the Ireland-UK case).
In any case, our results may be highly relevant to the many small and/or poor countries considering "dollarization". Further, there is no evidence that our results are very sensitive to the income or size of the countries involved, and López-Córdova and Meissner (2001) find similar results on gold-standard data. Nevertheless, Rose and van Wincoop (2001) attack these issues using a more structural approach that allows for trade diversion and multilateral spillover effects, and still find economically and statistically significant impacts of currency union on trade and welfare.
In addition, we treat currency unions as exogenous with respect to trade. There are a number of reasons to believe this assumption, since there is little evidence that countries have joined currency unions to increase trade. Nevertheless, some of the apparently large tradecreating effects of currency union may actually be a reflection of reverse causality. Rose (2000) and López-Córdova and Meissner (2001) provide evidence that the effect of monetary union on trade seems high even after accounting for potential endogeneity; Persson (2001) provides counter-arguments (but see Rose, 2001 ). But while we doubt the importance of this in practice,
we have been unable to devise a convincing set of instrumental variables for bilateral currency union incidence that would allow us to quantify this effect.
Finally, the impact of currency union departure/entry on trade may be subject to extremely long lags. If we add a comprehensive set of dummy variables for years after currency union exit to our default OLS gravity specification (tabulated in Table 2 ), we can trace out the response of bilateral trade to currency union dissolution. 14 Figure 2 provides a graph of these coefficients plotted against years since currency union departure; that is, it provides an estimate of the typical impact of currency union dissolution on trade. Trade is almost always lower after currency union dissolution (except for a blip which appears about a decade) than during currency union (the latter effect is marked with a horizontal line), usually substantially so. Thirty years after currency union exit, bilateral trade has fallen by more than half. However, the data do not speak very loudly on the issue; the graph shows that even thirty years after a pair of countries has dissolved a currency union, they seem to share a disproportionate amount of trade, ceteris paribus. Since the lags are long compared with the span of our data set, we may even have under-estimated the eventual impact of currency union on trade.
Conclusion
In this paper we used a large panel data set to estimate the time series effect of currency union on trade. Our data set includes annual bilateral trade between over 200 countries from 1948 through 1997. During this period of time, a large number of countries joined or (mostly) left currency unions. Controlling for a host of other influences through an augmented gravity model, we find that a pair of countries which joined/left a currency union experienced a neardoubling/halving of bilateral trade. This result is economically large, statistically significant, and seems insensitive to a number of perturbations in our methodology. 
